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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 04-4656
                        
JOHN H. BYRD,
           Appellant
v.
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;
GROUP LONG TERM DISABILITY INSURANCE 
PROGRAM FOR DAN RIVER, INC.
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-02339)
District Judge:  Honorable Clarence C. Newcomer
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 8, 2005
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Filed December 21, 2005)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
John H. Byrd appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against him,
and its denial of summary judgment in his favor.  The District Court held that Byrd failed
     Although the Dan River Long Term Disability Program is a defendant and appellee,1
the issues on appeal are directed at Reliance.
      The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We2
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.  
2
to prove that he was entitled to continuing disability benefits because he could perform
the essential functions of his occupation as the manager of human resources for his
employer, Dan River, Inc.  Thus, the District Court ruled in favor of the claims fiduciary,
appellee Reliance Standard, and the Dan River Disability Program.    We will affirm.1 2
Byrd’s claim rests on his contention that his job requires physical activity and
exertion beyond his physical capability.  Byrd was employed by Dan River as human
resources manager prior to January 2003, when he underwent back surgery to remedy
back and left leg pain and numbness.   Within two weeks of his surgery, Byrd told his
doctor that he had no further pain or weakness in his leg, and he was no longer
experiencing back pain.   There was evidence of continued progress:  Byrd was walking
one mile per day in April 2003, and four miles per day by July 2003.  Byrd had been
receiving disability benefits related to his condition following surgery, but in November
2003, Reliance notified him that he would no longer be eligible for benefits.  Physical
testing then ensued, with conflicting results.   Finally, Reliance requested a
comprehensive two-day examination, which confirmed that Byrd could perform full-time
work at a sedentary physical demand level.  Byrd contends that his occupation requires
exertion that he is unable to perform.
3The critical inquiry before the District Court, and on appeal before us, is the nature
of the physical exertion required in order for Byrd to perform his job.   Reliance proffered
the occupational description for human resource manager from the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, DOT § 166.177-018.  This classifies the job as
a sedentary strength occupation.   Dan River’s position description is consistent with this
exertion level.  However, Byrd relies upon an e-mail from Paul Dickens of Dan River
claiming that the job also required that Byrd “break up fights, carry boxes, save
employees from occupational disasters, and perform CPR.”   Byrd did not offer any
evidence that he had ever had to perform the tasks identified by Mr. Dickens.  Rather,
when asked to detail his duties, he identified them as “dealing with employee personnel
matters and labor relations.”   Byrd’s Statement, Long Term Disability Application,  May
18, 2003.
The District Court employed the appropriate standard of review on summary
judgment, as well as the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applicable in a
situation involving claim denial where the plan provides discretionary authority to the
claims fiduciary, here, Reliance.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 470 U.S. 242,
251-52 (1986); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).  We
review the District Court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, and
review its legal determinations de novo.  United States v. Dentsply Intern, Inc.,  399 F.3d
181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005).
     The District Court judge who issued the opinion and order in this case, Judge3
Clarence Newcomer, served on the District Court from November 1971 until one week
before his death on August 22, 2005.
4
The able District Court judge  determined that the “sliding scale approach” that we3
adopted in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000), should
apply because the employee benefit plan at issue provided discretionary authority to the
claims fiduciary.   Accordingly, the District Court reasoned that the Pinto factors weighed
in favor of a standard of review slightly higher than the arbitrary and capricious standard.
The District Court then proceeded to analyze the basis for the determination that
plaintiff was not totally disabled, as defined in the policy.   The District Court concluded:
After a careful review of the administrative record, this court
must reject plaintiff’s argument that potential work situations
such as breaking up fights, saving employees from
occupational disasters, and performing CPR is a part of the
plaintiff’s regular occupation.   There is no evidence to
suggest that plaintiff ever performed any of these tasks, or
that they represent any part of plaintiff’s regular occupation
. . . .  Here, Reliance considered both the DOT occupation
description as well as that of Dan River to determine the
material duties of plaintiff’s regular occupation.   Both title
descriptions, read in conjunction with the administrative
record, do not support plaintiff’s argument . . . .
. . . .
Reliance’s decision to deny benefits is not arbitrary and
capricious even under heightened scrutiny.   Because there are
no genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Reliance
acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Pinto standard, the
court will grant defendant’s motion and deny plaintiff’s
motion. 
District Court Op. at 7-8, 10.
     Byrd also asserted a claim under section 409 and 502(a)(2) of ERISA for breach of4
fiduciary duty, seeking to have Reliance removed as a claims fiduciary and to enjoin it
from serving as a fiduciary.   Our cases make clear that such relief is available to the plan,
not to individual plan participants.  See McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 109 (3d
Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1397 (3d Cir. 1997); Hein v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 88 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 1996); Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 146, 151 (3d
Cir. 1997); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons, Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24
F.3d 1491, 1501 (3d Cir. 1994).   This claim was properly dismissed.
5
We have noted that “regular occupation” is the usual work that the insured is
actually performing immediately before the onset of disability.  See Lasser v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2003).  Accordingly, we can find no
basis on which to disturb the District Court’s thoughtful and well-reasoned analysis and
conclusion.   We will AFFIRM.   4
